Te Bao, Yun Dai and Yongqin Wang, Overconfidence and Endogenous Contract Incompleteness”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2024.

作者及单位：

包特，新加坡南洋理工大学

戴芸，中山大学岭南学院

王永钦，复旦大学经济学院

Abstract

We set up a model on the hold-up problem with uncertain bargaining power and find that, when two agents are overconfident about their bargaining power ex ante, both of them may endogenously choose incomplete contract over complete contract even when complete contracting is feasible. The intuition behind the result is that ceteris paribus, overconfidence leads to a higher expected return to relationspecific investment and a higher investment level. Our model provides an additional behavioral explanation for the prevalence of contract incompleteness in addition to those existing in the literature.

文章来源 | JITE